San Diegans for Open Government v. City of San Diego – filed Dec. 27, 2018, publication ordered Jan. 15, 2019, Fourth District, Div. One

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court judgment upholding use of the “existing facilities” categorical exemption for a lease for a beachside amusement park, finding no unusual circumstances barring use of the exemption. The Petitioner, San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG), failed to demonstrate any causal connection between the “unusual circumstances” of a local measure limiting development and the alleged significant impacts of traffic and noise, which were also found to be speculative. 

The United States Supreme Court will not be taking up the California Supreme Court’s July 2017 decision in the Friends of the Eel River case.  In that decision, authored by Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye, the California Supreme Court held that the federal Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) did not preempt application of CEQA to the

On December 22, the Second Appellate District certified for publication its November 30 opinion in Los Angeles Conservancy v. City of West Hollywood, concerning a proposed mixed-use redevelopment of the “Melrose Triangle” site that would result in demolition of the existing buildings.  In this decision, the Court rejected the Conservancy’s claim that the City gave short-shrift to an alternative that would have preserved one of the buildings, which is located at 9080 Santa Monica Boulevard and may be eligible for listing on the California Register of Historical Resources as an exemplar of “Streamline Moderne Style” (the “9080 Building”).  Notably, the Court’s ruling reaffirmed prior case law holding that a lead agency may find an alternative to be infeasible where it is impractical or undesirable for reasons of public policy.

Since the 2004 decision in Bakersfield Citizens for Local Control v. City of Bakersfield, CEQA petitioners challenging development projects often assert that the lead agency has failed to adequately analyze urban decay (“blight”) impacts on historic downtown areas or other existing business districts.  However, such claims have met with limited success.  (See, for example, our blog posts concerning the 2016 decisions in Joshua Tree Downtown Business Alliance v. County of San Bernardino and Naraghi Lakes Neighborhood Preservation Association v. City of Modesto.)  The First Appellate District has just issued another decision addressing—and rejecting—urban decay claims.  In Placerville Historic Preservation League v. Judicial Council of California (filed 9/15/17; certified for publication 10/16/17), the Court upheld the EIR prepared for the new El Dorado County courthouse in the City of Placerville, finding that the EIR’s analysis of potential urban decay impacts was supported by substantial evidence.

CEQA decisions usually arise in the context of a challenge to a lead agency’s approval of a project and a related CEQA document.  However, in a recent decision, Kutzke v. City of San Diego (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1034 (certified for publication on May 23, 2017), the Fourth Appellate District resolved a court action arising from a lead agency’s rejection of a project and its MND, and did so in favor of the lead agency.

On July 27, the California Supreme Court released its long-awaited decision in Friends of the Eel River v. North Coast Railroad Authority (S222472), resolving a split among the State’s courts of appeal—but arguably conflicting with federal precedent—with respect to the scope of federal preemption of CEQA with respect to state-owned rail projects.

We discussed the oral arguments in this case in a prior blog post.  In a 6-1 opinion authored by Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye (with Justice Corrigan dissenting), the Court has now held that application of CEQA to a railroad project undertaken by a state entity, North Coast Railroad Authority (“NCRA”), was not preempted by the federal Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”).  The Court relied on a distinction between a state’s “regulation” of private railroad operations (which is clearly preempted) and a state’s “self-governance” with respect to a state-owned rail project (which, the Court held, is not preempted).  As a result, the Court reversed the judgment of the First Appellate District and remanded the matter for further proceedings on petitioners’ CEQA claims.

In March 2017, the Sixth Appellate District issued its decision in Aptos Council v. County of Santa Cruz, which rejected a two-pronged challenge to the County of Santa Cruz’s adoption of three zoning ordinances revising existing sections of the County zoning code, including an ordinance altering height, density, and parking requirements for hotels.  In affirming denial of the petition for writ of mandate, the appellate court held that (1) the County did not engage in improper “piecemeal” review of the three ordinances under CEQA, and (2) the negative declaration for the hotel ordinance did not need to consider environmental impacts that could result from future hotel development, where those impacts were not reasonably foreseeable. 

California Supreme CourtOn May 3–4, 2017, the California Supreme Court heard oral arguments in three cases with significant implications for California land use law. Below we summarize the main issue(s) argued in each matter and possible outcomes. Because many of these cases have been pending for years, the Court that originally voted to grant review has since been dramatically transformed by Governor Brown’s newest appointments, including Justices Cuéllar and Kruger. Consequently, predicting the likely outcome in any of these cases is particularly difficult.

East sacramentoCities charged with preparing EIRs for proposed projects often look to their general plans and other adopted policies to set thresholds of significance for assessing environmental impacts. A lead agency’s discretion to select a particular significance threshold has long been afforded deference under CEQA’s “substantial evidence” standard of review. Potential impacts assessed under a general plan-based significance threshold have similarly enjoyed deferential review under the substantial evidence standard. However, in East Sacramento Partnerships for a Livable City v. City of Sacramento (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 281, as modified on denial of rehearing, the Third Appellate District appears to have relied on the less deferential “fair argument” standard in holding that compliance with a general plan policy does not conclusively establish there is no significant environmental impact. In so holding, the court found that the City of Sacramento (“the City”) failed to adequately address the traffic impacts related to a development project.

LED Street LightOn April 13, the Second Appellate District disapproved two of its prior decisions that had expansively interpreted the availability of mandatory relief from default or dismissal under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b). In The Urban Wildlands Group, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, the court held that this mandatory relief provision did not apply to an adverse judgment at a CEQA merits hearing, resulting from plaintiff’s failure to lodge the administrative record with the court prior to the hearing.

The underlying mandate petition and complaint alleged a single cause of action challenging the City’s finding that a streetlight replacement project using LED lights was exempt from environmental review under CEQA. The parties stipulated that plaintiff would prepare the administrative record and, following certification by the City, lodge it with the trial court. However, plaintiff never lodged the certified record. At the hearing on the merits, the trial court determined that plaintiff could not present sufficient evidence to support its arguments because it failed to lodge the record. Accordingly, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s petition and complaint and entered judgment in favor of the City.